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Scholars agree that a core feature of the political style of the Holy Roman 
Empire was the focus on consensus, without which policies at the level 
of the Empire were impossible. The present article demonstrates that 
the consensus on which decisions of the imperial estates was based 
tended to be superficial and was often in danger of breaking down. This 
was because the diet’s open and sequential voting procedure allowed the 
bandwagon effect to distort outcomes. An analysis of the votes cast in 
the princes’ college of the diet of 1555 shows that low-status members of 
the college regularly imitated the decisions of high-status voters. 
Reforming the system would have required accepting that the members 
of the college were equals – an idea no one was prepared to countenance. 
Hence, superficial and transitory agreements remained a systematic 




On 28 July 1551 Emperor Charles V signed a document that seemed to mark a 
legislative success at least on par with the imperial Policey-Ordinances of 1530 
and 1548, or the Criminal Law Code of 1533: the ‘Augsburg Coinage Ordinance’,1 
the law that was to replace the plethora of coinage systems of the Holy Roman 
Empire with one common currency. Half a year before, the diet of Augsburg had 
brought a long-drawn out legislative process to a close by asking the emperor to 
 
* I would like to thank Joachim Whaley and David Chilosi for their advice and suggestions.  
1 For the text see O. Volckart (ed.) Eine Währung für das Reich: Die Akten der Münztage zu Speyer 
1549 und 1557 (Stuttgart, 2017), no. 90, pp. 344-372. 
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publish the ordinance.2 In the runup to this, the diet’s two higher colleges – the 
electors’ and the princes’ college – had agreed on the draft of the law and the cities’ 
college had had its say. By following the diet’s request and endorsing the bill, the 
emperor fulfilled the last constitutional requirements of legislation. Still, it did not 
even take a year for the ordinance to fail. Important imperial estates refused to 
make it public among their subjects and to implement it.3 What had gone wrong? 
 
The question is of wider importance. While the Policey-ordinances and the 
Criminal Law Code are examples of imperial laws that were put into effect 
reasonably smoothly,4 what happened to the coinage ordinance of 1551 was by no 
means unique. There were numerous instances in the history of the Holy Roman 
Empire where the imperial diet made decisions that at least some of the estates 
that had been involved in legislation failed to implement, or at least did not 
implement in full. The combined poll- and property tax, the ‘common penny’, that 
the diet granted in 1495 and that was at best partially collected, and the short-
lived imperial government created five years later are early cases; the common 
currency bill that Emperor Charles VI ratified in 1738 is a much later one.5 
Legislation, and more generally any political measure agreed at the level of the 
Empire, thus was not only the result of a complicated process; it was also often 
implemented only patchily. 
 
2 E. Eltz (ed.) Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Karl V.: Der Reichstag zu Augsburg 1550/51, 
vol. 2  (München, 2005), no. 305, p. 1590. 
3 O. Volckart, 'Power Politics and Princely Debts: Why Germany’s Common Currency Failed, 1549-
1556,' The Economic History Review 70, 3 (2017), pp. 758–78; 'Bimetallism and its Discontents:  
Cooperation and Coordination Failure in the Empire's Monetary Policies, 1549-59, '  
Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 105, 2 (2018), pp. 201-20; 'The Dear Old 
Holy Roman Realm: How Does it Hold Together? Monetary Policies, Cross-cutting Cleavages and 
Political Cohesion in the Age of Reformation,' German History 38, 4 (2020), pp. 365-86. 
4 G. Schmidt, '„Aushandeln“ oder „Anordnen“: Der komplementäre Reichs-Staat und seine Gesetze 
im 16. Jahrhundert,' in M. Lanzinner and A. Strohmeyer (eds.), Der Reichstag 1486-1613:  
Kommunikation - Wahrnehmung - Öffentlichkeiten (Göttingen, 2006), pp. 95-116, p. 109; J. 
Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, vol. I: From Maximilian I to the Peace of 
Westphalia 1493-1648 (Oxford, 2012), p. 368. 
5 For the Common Penny see M. Lanzinner, 'Der Gemeine Pfennig, eine richtungweisende 
Steuerform? Zur Entwicklung des Reichssteuersystems 1422 bis 1608,' in P. Rauscher, A. Serles, 
and T. Winkelbauer (eds.), Das "Blut des Staatskörpers". Forschungen zur Finanzgeschichte der 
Frühen Neuzeit (München, 2012), pp. 261-318, p. 274, the imperial government: Whaley, Germany, 
vol. 1, p. 34-35, the currency decree of 1738: T. Christmann, Das Bemühen von Kaiser und Reich 
um die Vereinheitlichung des Münzwesens: zugleich ein Beitrag zum Rechtssetzungsverfahren im 
Heiligen Römischen Reich nach dem Westfälischen Frieden (Berlin, 1988), pp. 141-173. 
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To some extent this was typical of all early modern polities. Even absolutist France 
enforced laws not nearly as effectively as Louis XIV’s reputation as a strong ruler 
might suggest, and there is nothing to indicate that the Holy Roman Empire 
performed worse.6 Still, its case is particularly interesting because for the last 
twenty years, the Empire’s political effectiveness has been one of the issues 
research has debated most intensively.7 Scholars who follow Georg Schmidt see it 
as a state that, though decentralised, did not in principle differ from other 
monarchies of the time;8 others argue that efforts to ‘modernise’ it in the late 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were at best partially successful and that large 
areas of dysfunctionality remained.9 The culturalist interpretations of the Empire 
fashionable earlier in this century and perhaps best represented by the work of 
Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger stressed the ceremonial functions of imperial 
institutions, claiming that they tended to push political decision making into the 
background.10 They thus lend a measure of support to the view that as a political 
body, the Holy Roman Empire was characterised by fundamental inefficiency. 
Indeed, they sometimes evoke the master narratives of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries that aimed at justifying the rise of Prussia by using the 
allegedly moribund Empire as a foil.11 
 
6 J. Schlumbohm, 'Gesetze, die nicht durchgesetzt werden: ein Strukturmerkmal des 
frühneuzeitlichen Staates?,' Geschichte und Gesellschaft 23, 4 (1997), pp. 647-63. For England see 
J. Hoppit, Failed legislation, 1660-1800: extracted from the Commons and Lords journals (London; 
Rio Grande, Ohio, 1997). 
7 For recent research surveys see Whaley, Germany, vol. 1, pp. 5-9; L. Scales and J. Whaley, 
'Rewriting the History of the Holy Roman Empire,' German History 36, 2 (2018), pp. 331-48 and 
M. Schnettger, Kaiser und Reich: Eine Verfassungsgeschichte (1500-1806) (Stuttgart, 2020), pp. 
330-338. 
8 G. Schmidt, Geschichte des Alten Reiches: Staat und Nation in der Frühen Neuzeit 1495-1806 
(München, 1999); 'Das frühneuzeitliche Reich - komplementärer Staat und föderative Nation,' 
Historische Zeitschrift 273, 2 (2001), pp. 371-99; 'The State and Nation of the Germans,' in R.J.W. 
Evans, M. Schaich, and P.H. Wilson (eds.), The Holy Roman Empire: 1495-1806 (Oxford, 2011), pp. 
43-62; J. Burkhardt, Deutsche Geschichte in der frühen Neuzeit (München, 2009). 
9 H. Schilling, 'Reichs-Staat und frühneuzeitliche Nation der Deutschen oder teilmodernisiertes 
Reichssystem: Überlegungen zu Charakter und Aktualität des Alten Reiches,' Historische 
Zeitschrift 272, 2 (2001), pp. 377-95;  
10 B. Stollberg-Rilinger, 'On the Function of Rituals in the Holy Roman Empire,' in R.J.W. Evans,  
M. Schaich, and P.H. Wilson (eds.), The Holy Roman Empire 1495-1806 (Oxford, 2011), pp. 359-73; 
Des Kaisers alte Kleider: Verfassungsgeschichte und Symbolsprache des Alten Reiches  (München, 
2008). 
11 J. Whaley, 'A New View of Old Ritual? Review of Stollberg-Rilinger, Barbara, Des Kaisers alte 
Kleider: Verfassungsgeschichte und Symbolsprache im Alten Reich,' H-German, H-Net Reviews, 
September (2009), pp. , p. 3. 
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What scholars of all persuasions have in common is the stress they place on the 
participatory and consensual character of political decision making at the level of 
the Empire.12 Schmidt, for example, argues that ‘Empire-wide collective and 
uniform action or activity could be achieved only on a consensual basis’.13 
Wolfgang Reinhard – one of his most outspoken critics – differs more in emphasis 
than substance: ‘A display of power by the emperor and the Empire could be 
achieved only on the fragile basis of a more or less voluntary consensus among the 
estates’.14 Stollberg-Rilinger, too, stresses the strong orientation towards 
consensus that characterised politics.15 She defines the Empire as an association 
of individuals that aimed at the protection of peace and law and was based on 
traditions and on the fundamental consensus of its members.16 Popular surveys of 
early modern German history that are explicitly trying to establishing a new 
master narrative go so far as to draw a direct line from this political culture to the 
one of the present-day Federal Republic.17 
 
If consensus was such a fundamental feature of imperial politics, it is all the more 
important to explain instances when it broke down – instances such as those 
briefly sketched above. In part, the culturalist approach to the Empire’s politics 
offers such an explanation. It argues that what gave the Empire substance was 
the ritual enactment of the respective status of its members and of the links that 
bound them to each other. When these rituals lost their meaning, when some 
estates began to ignore them or when princes failed to attend the diets altogether, 
the polity was bound to disintegrate.18 Conversely, anything the diet enacted in a 
ritual and symbolic way could not be undone.19 There are at least two problems 
 
12 Cf. H. Neuhaus, 'Zur politischen Kultur in  der Frühen Neuzeit,' Rechtsgeschichte: Zeitschrift 
des Max-Planck-Instituts für europäische Rechtsgeschichte 15 (2009), pp. 97-108, p. 98. 
13 Schmidt, '"Aushandeln"', p. 100 
14 W. Reinhard, 'Frühmoderner Staat und deutsches Monstrum: Die Entstehung des modernen 
Staates und das Alte Reich,' Zeitschrift für historische Forschung 29, 3 (2002), pp. 339-57, p. 352. 
15 Stollberg-Rilinger, Kleider, pp. 303-305; cf. Das Heilige Römische Reich Deutscher Nation: Vom 
Ende des Mittelalters bis 1806 (München, 2006), p. 120. 
16 Das Heilige Römische Reich Deutscher Nation: Vom Ende des Mittelalters bis 1806, p. 116; cf. 
e.g. Schnettger, Kaiser und Reich, p. 41-42.  
17 Burkhardt, Deutsche Geschichte, p. 8. 
18 Stollberg-Rilinger, Kleider, pp. 112-114. 
19 'Rituals', pp. 362, 369. 
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with this approach. First, historians stressing the importance of rituals for the 
effectiveness of the Holy Roman Empire nowhere spell out how exactly having 
taken part in them is supposed to have bound estates to implementing decisions 
that went against their interest. And second, even estates involved in a diet’s 
rituals on occasion went back on their commitments. The present article 




The core hypothesis of this article is that in order to explain why some decisions 
the imperial diet made were not (or only in part) put into practice, it is not 
sufficient to study the conditions that shaped their implementation ‘on the 
ground’. We must also examine the decision-making process itself. The way the 
diet reached an agreement on the publication of Charles V’s coinage ordinance of 
1551 suggests what it is we have to look for. One of the estates opposed to the 
planned common currency was electoral Saxony, and the elector had accordingly 
instructed his envoys to reject the project.20 This is what they did during the first 
meeting of the electors’ college on 7 August 1550. Ten days later (days filled with 
intensive discussions and some joint meetings with the princes’ college) the Saxon 
delegates had been brought round to the extent that they declared ‘if the others 
thought it necessary, they would willingly promote what was pleasing to the 
emperor’. From then on, we see them constructively discussing the currency bill 
alongside the other delegates, asserting on 27 November that they ‘did not wish to 
distance themselves from the majority’.21 Finally, on 14 February 1551, they put 
their signatures to the concluding document of the diet that instructed Charles V 
to publish the currency ordinance.22  
 
Two things are striking about this process. First, reaching a consensus evidently 
did not require agreeing on a compromise. It is important to make this distinction, 
 
20 E. Eltz (ed.) Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Karl V.: Der Reichstag zu Augsburg 1550/51 ,  
vol. 1  (München, 2005), no. 72, pp. 224-225. 
21 ibid., no. 82, pp. 293-294, 303, 435, 549. 
22 Eltz, Reichstag zu Augsburg 1550/51, no. 305, p. 1607. 
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not least because much of the relevant literature seems to conflate the two 
concepts.23 Second, the Saxon delegates at the diet not only considered the 
strengths and weaknesses of the planned bill but other factors, too: ‘what was 
pleasing to the emperor’ and what the majority thought. This suggests that they 
fell prey to the lure of a phenomenon that social scientists are discussing under 
the label ‘bandwagon effect’. 
 
The effect was first analysed in the 1950s when the economist Harvey Leibenstein 
studied instances where demand for a commodity grew due to the fact that others 
were also consuming the same commodity. He argued that this bandwagon effect 
was caused by the desire of people to purchase something ‘in order to get into “the 
swim of things”; in order to conform with the people they wish to be associated 
with; in order to be fashionable or stylish; or, in order to appear to be “one of the 
boys.”’.24 Similar things have been noted in politics, though here there is no 
consensus on what exactly constitutes a bandwagon effect. Conceptions range from 
equating it with any influence of the popularity of a candidate on voting behaviour 
to the result of the desire to end up on the winning side after the election.25 The 
present study starts out from Matthew Barnfield’s recent definition of the 
bandwagon-effect as the result of a ‘change in vote choice … towards a more 
popular or an increasingly popular candidate or party, motivated initially by this 
popularity’.26 Adapting this concept to early modern conditions when votes were 
cast not for candidates or parties but for policy proposals leaves its essence 
unchanged. In effect, we are looking at voting decisions based on extraneous 
considerations such as popularity, that is, on factors unrelated to answering the 
question or solving the political problem at hand. 
 
23 E.g. Stollberg-Rilinger, Kleider, pp. 304-305; Das Heilige Römische Reich Deutscher Nation: Vom 
Ende des Mittelalters bis 1806, p. 70. 
24 H. Leibenstein, 'Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' Demand,' 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 64, 2 (1950), pp. 183-207, p. 189. 
25 H.F. Dizney and R.W. Roskens, 'An Investigation of the "Bandwagon Effect" in a College Straw 
Election,' The Journal of Educational Sociology  36, 3 (1962), pp. 108-14; S. Callander, 'Bandwagons 
and Momentum in Sequential Voting,' The Review of Economic Studies 74, 3 (2007), pp. 653-84. 
26 M. Barnfield, 'Think Twice before Jumping on the Bandwagon: Clarifying Concepts in Research 
on the Bandwagon Effect,' Political Studies Review 18, 4 (2020), pp. 553-74, p. 554. 
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Much of the relevant research has focused on the motives that may cause an 
individual to join a bandwagon, which for reasons discussed in section V is of 
particular importance in the present context, too. Still, the consequences of the 
bandwagon effect are equally important, and here, one issue must be kept in mind: 
Whatever drives people to this kind of behaviour, the implication is always that 
they abandon their original political aim or preference and support one that 
already enjoys the support of others. This, in turn, implies that they agree to 
decisions that may go against what they had considered their own best interests 
before learning of the views of earlier voters – which is why a consensus that has 
come about under the influence of the bandwagon effect is superficial, why it tends 
soon to fall apart, and why the decision itself is at best partly put in practice. 
 
In modern, secret elections, whose outcomes are announced only after all votes 
have been cast, the bandwagon effect is the consequence of the publication of the 
results of opinion polls.27 In the past, it could be caused in a much less roundabout 
manner. Thus, before 1918 British elections were spread over two or more weeks, 
with the results of individual constituencies being announced before voters in 
other constituencies had even begun voting. Here research has found a bandwagon 
effect in favour of the party that eventually won the election.28 Like the British 
electorate of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the members of the 
imperial diet in the sixteenth century voted sequentially and in a way that allowed 
later voters to observe the actions of earlier ones.29 Here was therefore the perfect 
environment for the bandwagon effect to play out. How exactly this happened is 
analysed below, using the diet of Augsburg of 1555 as a case study. Before turning 
to this we must, however, outline the imperial constitution as far as decision 
 
27 C. Marsh, 'Back on the Bandwagon: The Effect of Opinion Polls on Public Opinion,' British 
Journal of Political Science 15, 1 (1985), pp. 51-74; M. Farjam, 'The Bandwagon Effect in an Online 
Voting Experiment With Real Political Organizations,' International Journal of Public Opinion 
Research  (2020), pp. 1-10. 
28 R. Hodgson and J. Maloney, 'Bandwagon Effects in British Elections, 1885-1910,' Public Choice 
157, 1/2 (2013), pp. 73-90. 
29 Other Central European representative assemblies of the Late Middle Ages and the early 
modern era followed similar procedures. For the diets of the Hanseatic League see J.L. Schipmann, 
Politische Kommunikation in der Hanse (1550-1631): Hansetage und westfälische Städte (Köln,  
Weimar, Wien, 2004), pp. 67-73, for those of the Swiss Confederacy A. Würgler, 'Tagsatzungen und 
Konferenzen,' in G. Kreis (ed.) Die Geschichte der Schweiz (Basel, 2014), pp. 133-5. 
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making at the diets was concerned (section III). In the following section (IV), the 
evidence on which the analysis is based is introduced. Section V contains the 
analysis, and section VI concludes by summarising the main findings and pointing 
out how they address the question this article sets out to answer. 
 
 
III. The imperial diet: procedures and decision making 
The procedures followed by the diet of the Holy Roman Empire were constantly 
evolving and never authoritatively laid down in writing. However, there were a 
number of stable features, and it is these that are of interest in the present context. 
First, like in all other early modern representative assemblies, the attendants 
sorted themselves into several groups that discussed the issues at hand separately 
before trying to reach a more general consensus.30 In the imperial diet these were 
the colleges mentioned above: the electors’ college, the one of the princes and that 
formed by the imperial cities. For the diet to pass a bill, the two higher colleges 
had to agree with each other. In this regard they were of equal weight, but as the 
electors’ college had only a handful of members (six up to the Thirty Years War, 
seven thereafter), each elector had a much larger influence than any of the up to 
280 members of the princes’ council (in practice there was no occasion when all 
were present). As for the cities’ college, the two others argued that it merely had a 
votum consultativum. They were prepared to let its members have their say but 
felt in no way bound by it. It was only in the Peace of Westphalia that the cities 
gained formal recognition as a college of equal standing.31 
 
A second constant was that the colleges structured the decision-making process in 
a way that reflected the position of each participant in the Empire’s feudal 
hierarchy. A report compiled by a member of the chancellery of the elector of Mainz 
in about 1570 explains how this worked.32 After describing the fundamental 
 
30 W.P. Blockmans, 'A Typology of Representative Institutions in Late Medieval Europe,' Journal 
of Medieval History 4 (1978), pp. 189-215, p. 195. 
31 Schnettger, Kaiser und Reich, pp. 34-43. 
32 K. Rauch (ed.) Traktat über den Reichstag: Eine offiziöse Darstellung aus der Kurmainzischen 
Kanzlei (Weimar, 1905); for the date and authorship see pp. 28-33; cf. H. Neuhaus, 'Der Streit um 
den richtigen Platz: Ein Beitrag zu reichsständischen Verfahrensformen in der Frühen Neuzeit,' 
9 
 
division of the princes’ college between spiritual and temporal members who sat 
on different benches, the author explained that in former times it had always been 
the archbishop of Salzburg who chaired the meetings, set the agenda and drew up 
the concepts of communications directed at the two other colleges. ‘However, for a 
long time now … Salzburg and Austria have taken turns in the order of session 
and talking and managed things alternatis vicibus’.33 It was these two princes – 
or their delegates – who asked the members of the college for their votes. 
Importantly, they did so in the order of rank (Session) of the attendants. 
Occasionally this so-called ‘polling’ (Umfrage) procedure broke down into open 
disputes where the delegates directly and repeatedly responded to the views voiced 
by other speakers.34 In most cases, however, Austria or Salzburg managed the 
meetings well and allowed each estate to speak only once. The general principle 
was to alternate between spiritual and temporal members, but as attendance was 
voluntary and the number and character of participants varied from one meeting 
to the next this was not always possible. The estates found the polling procedure 
highly advantageous, with the delegate of the bishop of Eichstätt maintaining on 
one occasion that it allowed ‘one estate to join another or to inform and guide 
him’.35 In other words, it allowed the bandwagon effect to play out in an observable 
manner.  
 
Disputes about the Session (ranking) were frequent. While earlier research 
regarded them as one of the most disturbing and dysfunctional features of the 
imperial diet, modern scholars appreciate their practical and constitutional 
relevance.36 Studies based on the culturalist approach to the Empire’s history 
sometimes give the impression that one of the primary functions of the diet was to 
 
in B. Stollberg-Rilinger (ed.) Vormoderne politische Verfahren (Berlin, 2001), pp. 281-301, pp. 282-
283. 
33 Rauch, Traktat, p. 65. 
34 For example on 18 June 1555. R. Aulinger, E. Eltz, and U. Machoczek (eds.), Deutsche 
Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Karl V.: Der Reichstag zu Augsburg 1555, vol. 2  (München, 2009), 
no. 145, pp. 1412-1414. 
35 ibid., no. 145, p. 1289. 
36 A. Luttenberger, 'Zeremonial- und Sessionskonflikte in der kommunikativen Praxis der 
Reichstage im 16. Jahrhundert,' in T. Neu, M. Sikora, and T. Weller (eds.), Zelebrieren und 
Verhandeln: Zur Praxis ständischer Institutionen im frühneuzeitlichen Europa  (Münster, 2009),  
pp. 233-52, p. 234. 
10 
 
provide an arena where the attendants could quarrel about their ranking. 
However, in fact there were ways to deal with such clashes that allowed the 
colleges to go about their business in a constructive way.37 One dispute, for 
example, was between Austria and Bavaria; this was resolved in an elegant 
manner: Austria received a place on the spiritual bench despite being a temporal 
estate.38 At the bottom end of the hierarchy were the ‘common estates’ that is, the 
prelates and the counts and barons. Unlike the higher ranking princes, they did 
not hold individual votes. Instead, at the diet of Augsburg the prelates had only 
one joint vote, while the minutes listed either one vote for the counts or two (in 
which case they made a distinction between the Swabian counts and those from 
the Wetterau district in modern Hesse). This probably depended on which of the 
delegates of the counts happened to be present. A typical ranking would be 
(spiritual estates in italics): Salzburg – Bavaria – Austria – Württemberg – 
Würzburg – Pfalz-Simmern – the master of the Teutonic Order – Braunschweig – 
Bamberg – Brandenburg-Küstrin – Eichstätt – Jülich-Cleves-Berg – Speyer – 
Hesse – Strasbourg – Baden-Durlach – Constance – Baden-Baden – Augsburg – 
Anhalt – Regensburg – Passau – Naumburg – Fulda – Kempten – the prelates – 
the counts.39 We need to bear in mind, though, that this was to some degree 
variable, without changes from one meeting to the next necessarily causing 
disputes that left any traces in the sources. 
 
37 ibid., pp. 235-236; T.F. Hartmann, Die Reichstage unter Karl V.: Verfahren und 
Verfahrensentwicklung 1521-1555 (Göttingen, 2017), p. 259; cf. B. Stollberg-Rilinger, 'Zeremoniell 
als politisches Verfahren: Rangordnung und Rangstreit als Strukturmerkmale des 
frühneuzeitlichen Reichstags,' in J. Kunisch (ed.) Neue Studien zur frühneuzeitlichen 
Reichsgeschichte (Berlin, 1987), pp. 91-132, p. 107; Kleider, pp. 41-46.  
38 J.J. Moser, Teutsches Staats-Recht, vol. 36: Darinnen von der Rang-Ordnung unter denen 
Reichs-Fürsten ... gehandelt wird (Leipzig, Ebersdorf, 1748), p. 147. 
39 Aulinger, Eltz, and Machoczek, Reichstag zu Augsburg 1555, no. 145, pp. 1286-1288. 
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Figure 1: The Princes' college at the diet of Augsburg 1555 
 
 
By the mid-sixteenth century it was generally accepted that within the colleges 
decisions should be based on the majority of the votes. Scholars have paid much 
attention to how this principle emerged and to the consequences it had especially 
in the context of the Reformation.40 In fact, until a workable solution was found in 
 
40 K. Schlaich, 'Maioritas - protestatio - itio in partes - corpus Evangelicorum: Das Verfahren im 
Reichstag des Heiligen Römischen Reichs Deutscher Nation nach der Reformation,' Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Kanonistische Abteilung 63 (1977), pp. 264-99; H.-J. Becker, 
'Protestatio, Protest: Funktion und Funktionswandel eines rechtlichen Instruments,' Zeitschrift 
für Historische Forschung 5, 4 (1978), pp. 385-412; K. Schlaich, 'Die Mehrheitsabstimmung im 
Reichstag zwischen 1495 und 1613,' Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung 10, 3 (1983), pp. 299-340;  
W. Schulze, 'Majority Decision in the Imperial Diets of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' 
Journal of Modern History 58 (1986), pp. S46-S63. 
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the Peace of Westphalia, it was in relation to religious matters that the procedure 
was challenged most often and most successfully. Thus, during the negotiations 
leading up to the Religious Peace at the diet of Augsburg in 1555, the delegates of 
the dukes of Saxony stated that in this matter a compromise was impossible: One 
party had to give or nothing would come of the peace – ‘in which case his masters 
would in no way allow themselves to be outvoted where religion was concerned’.41 
Still, finding a majority in temporal matters was not always easy either. The 
polling procedure did not require the members of the college merely to vote ‘yea’ 
or ‘nay’; rather, it gave them the chance to voice their opinions, to make 
suggestions and countersuggestions (to which later voters then could react) or 
even to go entirely off tangent.42 Thus, when Wilhelm von Waldburg, who spoke 
in Austria’s name, summarised the results of the polling that took place on the 
afternoon of March 30, 1555, he pointed out that he and the other Austrian 
councillors had listened to diverse opinions: Some members had joined Salzburg’s 
position; others held that agreeing was impossible and that the electors’ college 
should be notified of the conflicting points of view; a third faction favoured 
searching for a compromise – ‘and that was the opinion he and his colleagues 
considered the majority view’.43 The limitations of the source make it hard to tell 
if Waldburg was right. It is to this issue that we must turn next. 
 
 
IV. The source 
The best-documented and most detailed accounts of the negotiations are those of 
the electors’ college. However, this was also by far the smallest college – too small 
for a systematic analysis of voting patterns. From the Cities’ college, we have 
detailed minutes from 1556 onward. This College was much larger than that of 
the electors but the minutes of its deliberations show that its discussions were 
often less formal than the report on the diet’s procedures compiled by the 
chancellery of the elector of Mainz in about 1570 claimed. At the diet of 
 
41 Aulinger, Eltz, and Machoczek, Reichstag zu Augsburg 1555, no. 145, p. 1352. 
42 Cf. Hartmann, Reichstage, p. 214. 
43 Aulinger, Eltz, and Machoczek, Reichstag zu Augsburg 1555, no. 145, p. 1356. 
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Regensburg of 1556-57, for example, Regensburg chaired the college. During the 
meeting on 18 November 1556, its representative opened the discussion. Then the 
delegates of Augsburg, Nuremberg, Ulm, Regensburg (again), Strasbourg, 
Augsburg (again), Nuremberg (again), Ulm (again) and Rothenburg ob der Tauber 
spoke. Regensburg concluded.44 The proceedings resembled less an orderly 
sequential polling than an open discussion where everybody could raise his hand 
and be called up to voice his opinion.  
 
This leaves us with the princes’ college. The earliest reasonably detailed and 
comprehensive polling minutes are from the diet of Augsburg of 1555. They were 
kept by Ulrich Zasius, one of the key councillors of King Ferdinand I, who redacted 
them following each meeting.45 The diet was probably the most important one that 
took place between 1495, when the institution evolved out of courtly assemblies 
and meetings of the electors and the drawn-out reform process of the imperial 
constitution began,46 and 1663, when the last diet assembled and remained in 
session until the end of the Empire in 1806.47 In 1555, King Ferdinand (who 
presided in the absence of his brother Emperor Charles V) and the imperial estates 
had to deal with an extraordinarily complex situation. Decades of mounting 
religious discord had come to a head in 1552 when an alliance of Protestant princes 
rebelled, attacked the emperor and forced him to flee across the Alps. Ferdinand 
and the ‘war princes’ quickly managed to negotiate a provisional settlement, but 
Charles V was not prepared to give up his aim of religious unity. The diet that was 
to formalise the settlement and to pass it into imperial law could begin only once 
 
44 J. Leeb (ed.) Reichsversammlungen 1556-1662: Der Reichstag zu Regensburg 1556/57, vol. 1  
(München, 2013), no. 234, pp. 575-577. 
45 Aulinger, Eltz, and Machoczek, Reichstag zu Augsburg 1555, no. 145, pp. 1272-1536. For Zasius 
see W. Goetz, 'Zasius, Johann Ulrich,' in Historische Commission bei der Königlichen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften (ed.) Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie (Leipzig, 1898), pp. 706-8.; C. Pflüger, 
'Vertreulich communiciren und handlen: Die kommissarisch entsandten Räte König Ferdinands 
als königliche Autoritätsträger,' in A. Baumann, et al. (eds.), Reichspersonal: Funktionsträger für 
Kaiser und Reich (Köln, Weimar, Wien, 2003), pp. 291-334, p. 303. 
46 H. Angermeier, 'Der Wormser Reichstag 1495: Ein europäisches Ereignis,' Historische Zeitschrift 
261, 3 (1995), pp. 739-68. 
47 Cf. M. Heckel, 'Der Augsburger Religionsfriede: Sein Sinnwandel vom provisorischen Notstands-
Instrument zum sakrosankten Reichsfundamentalgesetz religiöser Freiheit und Gleichheit,' 
JuristenZeitung 60, 20 (2005), pp. 961-70; A. Kohnle, '41. Augsburger Religionsfrieden 1555,' in I. 
Dingel, et al. (eds.), Handbuch Frieden im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit / Handbook of Peace in 
Early Modern Europe (München, 2020), pp. 837-56. 
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it had become clear that the emperor’s last attempt to shore up his position by 
military means had failed. 
 
In Augsburg in 1555, the imperial estates therefore had not only to find a modus 
vivendi for Catholics and Protestants; they had also to deal with the fallout of 
years of political unrest, most seriously with the activities of Margrave Albert 
Alcibiades of Brandenburg-Kulmbach. Alcibiades had first joined the ‘war princes’ 
and then changed sides. After a bloody defeat in North Germany, and when a 
league of Franconian estates began to conquer and occupy his castles around 
Bayreuth, he fled to France from where he was fomenting more trouble, trying to 
muster mercenaries to regain his possessions. Next to religious concord, internal 
peace and law enforcement were therefore at the top of the agenda of the diet. The 
assembly ended with the conclusion of the Religious Peace of Augsburg that 
addressed and to a large extent solved all these problems. Over time, the Peace 
began to be considered one of the fundamental laws of the Empire and part of its 
constitution; it helped keeping the polity afloat until the early nineteenth century. 
 
The following excerpt from Zasius’s minutes of one of the meetings of the princes’ 
college (the one of 22 June) gives an example of how the sequential polling 
procedure functioned (only the German passages have been translated): 
 
‘In consilio principum. 
Salzburg presides and proposes to discuss the internal peace ordinance and the 
news about the mustering of mercenaries that his royal majesty brought. 
 
Salzburg:  Internal peace placet because of the muster.  
Bavaria:  Constitutio placet. Mustering: This must be considered carefully. 
Austria:  Ut scitur. 
Palatinate:  Has concerns about several paragraphs of the internal peace 
ordinance. Wants for the present to add nothing to their 
memorandum and to wait for that of the electors. Muster ut 
Bavaria. 
Master of the Teutonic Order: Idem. 
Saxony:  Has several concerns about the internal peace; but as they have 
learnt from Austria that the consultations have ended, placet what 
is being planned.  
15 
 
Bamberg:  Internal peace cannot be improved. Muster: Have informed his 
royal majesty of what they learnt. Recently also learnt that 6000 
horse have come together. But the fire can still be put out if one 
acts well. 
Braunschweig: Finds little to change in the internal peace ordinance except some 
few improvements. …’  
 
and so on via Worms, ‘Margrave Hans’ (John of Brandenburg-Küstrin), Würzburg 
etc. down to the prelates and the counts of the Wetterau district in Hesse and 
Swabia.48  
 
The problems of the source are immediately apparent. Two stand out: First, 
Salzburg suggested that two distinct issues should be discussed in one go, and 
second, Zasius’s notes were so sketchy that it is often hard to make out the 
positions of the delegates. In particular where Austria was concerned, his ‘ut 
scitur’ was typical – after all, he kept the notes for his own use and for that of other 
Austrian delegates, who were familiar with their own points of view and 
arguments. Still, the attendants often seem to have restricted their contributions 
to short remarks, with the ‘idem’ of the master of the Teutonic Order being 
characteristic. On other occasions, Zasius made very brief entries such as ‘ut 
Austria’, ‘ut Austria in all points’, ‘placet ut Bavaria’, ‘concordat cum Württemberg. 
Concerning the sects he is happy with Salzburg’s position’ or something of that 
kind.49 
 
In the context of the analysis below, the issues on which the members of the 
princes’ college were voting are of secondary interest. What matters is determining 
whether an estate jumped on a bandwagon by joining a preceding voter. This is a 
question that the minutes allow answering provided we treat polls like the one 
quoted above (where two distinct issues were discussed) as not one but two rounds 
of voting.  
 
48 Aulinger, Eltz, and Machoczek, Reichstag zu Augsburg 1555, no. 145, pp. 1417-1418. 




While it is likely that the procedural rules of the princes’ college allowed the 
bandwagon effect to play out, proving it is challenging. After all, the members of 
the college did not necessarily reveal their political preferences when they 
announced their voting decisions.50 Among their motives for voting like someone 
higher up in the ranking, we can expect that they may have 
 
a) had intended to vote in that way all along, 
b) been genuinely convinced by an argument put forward by an earlier voter, 
c) voted strategically in order to achieve a result they considered sub-optimal 
but that would prevent an even worse outcome, 
d) voted in order to curry favour with a higher-ranking member of the college 
or to avoid antagonizing that member, 
e) voted to find themselves on the winning side at the end of the round of 
polling. 
 
Only in cases a) and b) did the voter reveal what his preferred response to the 
issue at hand was. By contrast, in cases c), d) and e) voting decisions involved 
extraneous considerations, that is, motives not related to answering the question 
Austria or Salzburg had put to the discussion. Occasionally, the delegates were 
frank enough to mention other such motives (for example, the envoy of the bishop 
of Regensburg pointed out that in religious matters he would have to vote like 
Salzburg because the archbishop of Salzburg was his master’s immediate 
superior).51 Normally, however, Zasius’s minutes do not allow distinguishing 
between cases where an estate’s voting decision reflected his pre-poll preferences 
and where it did not. That is why we cannot separate answering the question of 
whether a bandwagon existed from analysing what may have caused it – both 
issues are intertwined.  
 
One potential solution to the problem might be to compare the written instructions 
which the advisers of the members of the college received from their home 
governments with their voting decisions. We have the instructions of three of the 
 
50 Cf. Barnfield, 'Bandwagon', p. 557 
51 Aulinger, Eltz, and Machoczek, Reichstag zu Augsburg 1555, no. 145, p. 1278. 
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45 estates represented in the college during the diet of 1555.52 The documents were 
prepared in advance of the diet; they therefore addressed several questions which 
in the event the college either did not discuss at all or touched only briefly. Envoys 
at imperial assemblies could of course request further and more detailed 
instructions from their governments, and we know of occasions when they did so. 
However, given the poor infrastructure of the time it is no surprise to learn of cases 
where the answer never arrived before the assembly broke up.53 During the 
negotiations in Augsburg in 1555, some delegates moreover claimed that they had 
received no instructions at all that went beyond a general injunction to act in the 
interest of the welfare of the German nation,54 while others appealed to their 
colleagues’ flexibility: Strasbourg, for example, stated that ‘he was not of the 
opinion that every one of them should merely follow his instructions, for this would 
not serve to overcome their differences; rather, they should strive to find common 
ground’.55 The upshot is that, normally, the envoys and councillors who sat in the 
princes’ college had to make up their minds on the spot. 
 
Since comparing instructions and voting decisions is fruitless, we turn to a 
regression analysis that establishes links between the diverse characteristics of 
the estates and their votes. If we find characteristics that are unrelated to the 
political issues at hand but still had a systematic influence on voting, we can be 
sure of the effect of extraneous motives. If we then can trace some of these motives 
to the popularity (or similar features) of the member of the college whose decision 
the voter imitated, the analysis strongly suggests that what we are observing is 
indeed the bandwagon effect. 
 
The principle is straightforward. Zasius’s minutes tell us how the members of the 
princes’ college voted in 44 rounds of polling, two of which addressed two distinct 
questions at once. All in all, 1023 votes were cast during the diet. For each of these, 
 
52 ibid., 1., no. 136, pp. 574-576, no. 136a, p. 576, no. 137, pp. 578-579, no. 137a, pp. 579-581, no. 
138, pp. 582-609, no. 139, pp. 609-615, no. 142, pp. 629-641. 
53 Cf. Volckart, Währung, no. 5, pp. 26-27. 
54 Aulinger, Eltz, and Machoczek, Reichstag zu Augsburg 1555, no. 145, pp. 1277-1278.  
55 ibid., no. 145, pp. 1409. 
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we can determine the share of earlier voters who voted in the same way. This is 
the ‘bandwagon value’. Thus, in the poll on 6 March 1555, Salzburg presided and 
asked whether the college should first discuss the religious peace, as the electors 
suggested. Salzburg’s own vote was ‘no’; the maintenance of internal peace and 
law should be discussed first. Württemberg on place two agreed (bandwagon value 
1.00). Austria followed on place three and voted in favour of calling a committee 
to discuss the religious peace (bandwagon value 0.00). Bavaria was next and joined 
Austria, that is, it voted like one out of three earlier voters (bandwagon value 0.33). 
Two more estates followed, each with ideas of their own, until it was the turn of 
the master of the Teutonic Order who again voted in the same way as Austria, 
that is, as two out of six earlier voters had done (bandwagon value 0.33). After 
several more votes were cast, the last estate present (Strasbourg, on place 15) 
voted like Austria, too. By then, 6 out of the 14 earlier voters had done the same, 
which drove the bandwagon value up to 0.43.56 In this way, we can determine the 
value we must explain for each of the more than 1000 votes cast.57 
 
Which independent, explanatory variables can we use for that purpose? As the 
number of potential answers to the questions the princes’ college discussed was 
not infinite, it was the more likely that a member would vote like a higher-ranking 
estate, the lower his position was in the Session (ranking). It is therefore essential 
to control for each estate’s rank, which varied across polls depending  on whether 
Austria or Salzburg chaired the meeting and according to the number and 
character of the attendants. The economic prosperity of an estate’s territory, which 
was closely related to its political power, may also have played a role, with more 
powerful estates possibly less inclined to imitate the voting decisions of earlier 
voters. GDP estimates exist for Germany as a whole, but not for the lands of 
individual estates.58 However, there are data that can be used to approximate 
prosperity. Thus, the ‘Roman Month’ payments listed in the imperial register and 
intended for the defence of the Empire were expected to reflect economic 
 
56 ibid., no. 145, pp. 1282. 
57 See the appendix for a mathematical definition of the bandwagon value.  
58 U. Pfister, 'Economic Growth in Germany, 1500–1850' (paper presented at the Contribution to 
the Quantifying of Long Run Economic Development Conference Venice, 22–24 March 2011, 2011).  
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conditions. This was made explicit during their renegotiation in the 1540s, with 
the document concluding the diet of Regensburg in 1541 stating that the 
contributions of some estates should be reduced ‘because of their impoverishment’ 
whereas others, ‘whose wealth has obviously increased’, should pay more.59 Here, 
the payments laid down in the updated imperial register of 1545 can be used.60 
Presumably the ‘Kammerzieler’-payments used to maintain the imperial chamber 
court and defined in 1521 reflected the estates’ prosperity, too.61 Revenue data 
have been preserved unevenly and are in any case hard to compare in the absence 
of a common currency.62 However, occasionally Italian diplomats who visited 
Germany sent home lists of the revenues of the imperial estates. One such list was 
compiled by Alois Mocenigo, a Venetian who spent the years 1546 to 1548 at the 
imperial court and had access to King Ferdinand’s chancellery.63 Many of the 
values he listed (in gold florins) were based on guesswork, but however accurate 
they may be, his information has the advantage of being consistent. Not 
surprisingly, an estate’s Roman Month- and Kammerzieler-payments and its 
revenues were correlated with each other.64 The issue is addressed through a 
principal component analysis, a statistical technique used for data reduction that 
allows extracting the common factor underlying the three variables.65 This 
common factor (‘Wealth’) is then used in the regression analysis. 
 
It is also possible to control for whether an estate had a temporal or spiritual ruler 
(this is a dummy-variable that takes the value of 1 if the estate was temporal and 
else is 0) and whether it had adopted the Reformation (again a dummy-variable, 
 
59 A. Luttenberger (ed.) Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Karl V.: Der Reichstag zu 
Regensburg 1541 (München, 2018), no. 941, p. 3620. 
60 R. Aulinger (ed.) Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Karl V.: Der Reichstag zu Worms 1545, 
vol. 2  (München, 2003), no. 113b, pp. 1084-1098. 
61 A. Wrede (ed.) Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Karl V., vol. 2  (Gotha, 1896), no. 56, pp. 
424-442. 
62 M. Lanzinner, Friedenssicherung und politische Einheit des Reiches unter Kaiser Maximilian II. 
1564 - 1576 (Göttingen, 1993), pp. 173-178. 
63 C. Zwierlein, 'Deutsche und Italienische Staatsbeschreibungskunst: Die Einkünfte aller 
Reichsstände, ca. 1547/48 nach einer unbekannten Quelle,' Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung 
39, 4 (2012), pp. 593-660, pp. 609-610, 624. 
64 See Table 4 (Appendix). 
65 Cf. I. Jolliffe and J. Cadima, 'Principal Component Analysis: A Review and Recent 
Developments,' Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 374 (2016), pp. 1-16. 
20 
 
1 if an estate was Protestant, 0 if not). Moreover, while all estates whose voting 
decisions are analysed were members of the princes’ college, their social 
backgrounds differed in ways that cut across the Session (ranking) order (in 
contrast to what is sometimes claimed,66 social status and political rank were 
separable). There were scions of the higher nobility – that is, major princes, 
including bishops like George of Lüttich, who was an illegitimate son of Emperor 
Maximilian I –, those whom we can call the middle nobility, that is, counts and 
barons, some of whom, for example Cardinal Otto von Waldburg, the bishop of 
Augsburg, reached high positions in the Church –, and members of the lower 
nobility such as Archbishop Michael von Kuenburg of Salzburg. Some bishops, for 
instance Christoph Metzler (Constance) had a bourgeois background. In short, the 
opportunities for personal advancement the Church offered allow us defining 
dummy-variables that capture the social status of the members of the princes’ 
college.67 Conceivably, low-status members had a higher propensity for imitating 
votes cast by earlier voters whose status was higher. Table 1 summarises the 
descriptive statistics of the data. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Individual variables 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Attendants per poll 1,023 23.30 5.87 4 36 
Kammerzieler 38 274.61 206.84 60 900 
Roman Month 37 859.89 786.92 72 3,600 
Revenues 36 79,222.22 93,189.86 10,000 400,000 
Temporal estate 45 0.42 0.50 0 1 
Protestant estate 45 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Low nobility 45 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Middle nobility 45 0.20 0.40 0 1 
High nobility 45 0.36 0.48 0 1 
 
The data are structured like a panel, that is, we have observations for up to 45 
estates over altogether 46 rounds of polling. The panel is unbalanced, though, as 
the composition of the princes’ college changed from one poll to the next, with only 
a few estates attending all meetings. To be sure, on a number of occasions Austria 
 
66 Stollberg-Rilinger, Kleider, p. 302. 
67 Cf. R. Holbach, 'Sozialer Aufstieg in der Hochkirche,' in G. Schulz (ed.) Sozialer Aufstieg: 
Funktionseliten im Spätmittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit  (München, 2002), pp. 337-56. 
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and Salzburg did not enforce the rule that each estate should speak only once per 
round. However, this concerns only eleven out of the more than 1000 votes – so 
few that dropping these cases is acceptable. If we do so, the combination of the IDs 
of each poll and each estate uniquely identifies all remaining observations. Many 
more are dropped because we do not have Roman Month, Kammerzieler and 
revenue data for all estates present at the meetings of the princes’ college. 
 
In order to gain a first impression of which factors merit closer attention, the 
analysis uses a fixed-effects fractional probit model (appropriate when the 
dependent variable is a fraction (it lies between 0 and 1) and the number of cross-
sections (here: estates) is about the same as that of the time periods (that is, the 
polls).68 Table 2, column 1 reports the results.  
 
 
68 Cf. L.E. Papke and J.M. Wooldridge, 'Panel Data Methods for Fractional Response Variables 
with an Application to Test Pass Rates,' Journal of Econometrics 145, 1 (2008), pp. 121-33. 
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Rank (Session) 0.0933   
 (0.0998)   
Rank (Session) gap  -0.4205*** -0.987** 
  (0.0844) (0.449) 
Wealth -0.1265*   
 (0.0692)   
Wealth gap  0.7744*** 2.562*** 
  (0.0681) (0.392) 
Common ancestors  -0.0381 -0.504 
  (0.1089) (0.866) 
Distance between places of residence   0.1140* 0.282 
  (0.0457) (0.268) 
Temporal estate -0.5018   
 (0.4229)   
Both estates temporal  -0.1965 2.482 
  (0.4791) (1.901) 
Protestant estate 0.8603   
 (0.2956)   
Both estates protestant  -0.0087 -0.0716 
  (0.1030) (0.639) 
Low nobility 1.5371***   
 (0.1420)   
Low voting like high nobility  0.2500** 1.703*** 
  (0.0727) (0.470) 
Low voting like middle nobility  -0.0906 -12.05 
  (0.1399) (2,222) 
Middle nobility 1.3419***   
 (0.1459)   
Middle voting like high nobility  0.2437 29.18 
  (0.2144) (2,212) 
Middle voting like low nobility  -0.1206 12.99 
  (0.2305) (2,024) 
High nobility 1.5898***   
 (0.2960)   
High voting like low mobility  -0.3657 0.118 
  (0.4769) (1.853) 
High voting like middle nobility  -0.3391 -11.82 
  (0.4592) (2,001) 
Constant -2.1915*** -1.2074***  
 (0.3300) (0.2804)  
    
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 825 559 529 
Number of estates   28 
Pseudo R2 0.0290 0.1442  
 
When controlling for other influences, the rank in the Session that a member of 
the princes’ college held did not have any significant influence on his propensity 
to imitate earlier voters. By contrast, how wealthy an estate was played an 
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important role. As the Wealth-coefficient indicates, members of the princes’ college 
were the less inclined to vote like someone higher up in the Session, the higher 
their Roman Month and Kammerzieler payments were and the more revenues they 
received. The implication is that economically weaker estates were less 
independent-minded, which is clear evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
their decisions were systematically influenced by considerations unrelated to the 
issue Austria or Salzburg had put to the vote. However, other factors were even 
more important. Nothing influenced voting decisions as much as the personal 
status of the members of the college, that is, their family background in the higher, 
middle or lower nobility.69  The analysis holds no clue as to why this factor was so 
important, and it is too early to speculate about potential causes. What is clear is 
that it requires closer attention. Still, it has already become obvious that when 
Austria or Salzburg conducted a poll, certain members of the princes’ college were 
systematically influenced by extraneous considerations, that is, by motives that 
had nothing to do with the issue they and their colleagues had to decide. 
 
We can explore this further by looking at the relations between each voter (or the 
prince in whose name he acted) and the earliest voter on whose decision he 
modelled his own vote. In this way it is possible to examine whether the gap 
between the ranks a voter and his model held in the Session and that between 
their wealth (derived through the principal component analysis) affected voting 
decisions. It is also possible to look at whether being related played a role (this can 
be approximated by counting the number of common ancestors, going back four 
generations, that is, roughly to the late fourteenth century). In a similar way, we 
can examine the influence of the distance between the usual places of residence of 
the voter and his model (testing whether neighbours tended to imitate each other) 
and the effect of both estates being temporal or having adopted the Reformation. 
Finally, it is possible to define dummy-variables that capture whether estates of 
diverse social backgrounds adapted their decisions to those whose status was 
higher or lower (low voting like high or middle nobility, middle voting like high or 
low nobility etc.). 
 
69 The reference category are members of the college who came from bourgeois families.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Pairwise variables 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Rank gap 736 10.29 7.14 1 35 
Roman Month gap  600 -1,463.79 1,177.07 -3528 1930 
Kammerzieler gap 622 -347.60 294.66 -840 510 
Revenue gap 591 -153,206.40 -153,206.40 -390,000 332,000 
Common ancestors 684 1.26 2.66 0 14 
Both princes temporal 735 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Both princes Protestant 1,012 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Distance between residences 684 350.69 180.45 32.04 827.36 
Low voting like high nobility 1012 0.19 0.38 0 1 
Low voting like middle nobility 1012 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Middle voting like high nobility 1012 0.08 0.29 0 1 
Middle voting like low nobility 1012 0.01 0.13 0 1 
High voting like low nobility 1012 0.05 0.21 0 1 
High voting like middle nobility 1012 0.01 0.07 0 1 
 
Again, the analysis uses a fixed effects fractional probit model. Table 2, column 2, 
summarises its output.   
 
One further aspect can be examined. It was not only electoral Saxony in the 
elector’s college that stressed the influence of the majority view on its own voting 
decisions. In the princes’ college, Jülich-Cleves-Berg declared on March 6 that ‘he 
was not displeased to vote ut majority’. Similarly, Brandenburg-Küstrin 
announced on March 30 that he was prepared to support the majority while 
Würzburg stated he ‘did not want to distance himself from the majority’. On June 
15 Merseburg and Naumburg pledged their support for the majority view, as did 
the prelates and counts.70 In short, the estates regularly took into account how the 
majority of their colleagues voted. To examine the effect of this motive, we can 
define a new dependent variable: a dummy that is 1 if the share of earlier estates 
voting in the same way as the voter of interest is 50 per cent or larger, and else is 
0. This analysis employs a fixed-effects panel logit model (Table 2, column 3). 
 
The results lend strong support to the hypothesis that extraneous motives affected 
the decisions of the estates. Interestingly, the gap between the ranks of a voter 
and his model was far more important than his rank taken on its own. As will 
 
70 Aulinger, Eltz, and Machoczek, Reichstag zu Augsburg 1555, no. 145, pp. 1282, 1346, 1410. 
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become clear in a moment, this is an important result that needs to be seen in the 
context of the influence of the voter’s personal status or family background. The 
Wealth gap played the expected role: the larger it was, the more likely was a 
member of the college to imitate the decision of an earlier voter. By contrast, 
whether two members were related was irrelevant – a finding which suggests that 
inner-family disputes were as common as familial harmony. The distance between 
the places of residence influenced decisions; in fact, the members of the college 
tended to observe how their neighbours voted and then did the opposite (though 
this was no longer relevant once a bandwagon had gained so much momentum 
that a majority had been formed). It is tempting to interpret this finding as 
evidence of the lack of trust among the estates in the period before the conclusion 
of the Religious Peace of Augsburg. Strikingly, common characteristics such as 
Protestantism or being temporal princes played no role at all. Had they done so, it 
would have been likely that shared interests influenced the decisions of the 
members of the college, that is, that they considered the questions to which they 
had to find answers while keeping in mind their own aims and preferences. That 
this was not the case strongly suggests that many members of the college 
systematically failed to consider the issues at hand at their own merit. Rather, 
they were swayed by factors such as how much more revenues other princes 
received, by how far away they lived, and by their personal status or family 
background. 
 
The analysis indicates that having a lower status than the members of the 
Empire’s princely dynasties was among the most important systematic factors 
that influenced voting. Regardless of their position in the Session, their religious 
affiliation or their spiritual or temporal character, members of the college who 
belonged to knightly families were c. 25 per cent more likely to imitate the 
decisions of earlier voters than others. Their propensity to join a majority, whose 
formation a high-status prince had triggered, was remarkably strong, too. While 
the analysis itself does not suggest what caused this effect, it is likely that it was 
a consequence of informal institutions – constraints on behaviour enforced in an 
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informal way and often internalised71 – that demanded deference to one’s betters. 
The finding that the gap between the ranks of a voter and his model played a 
larger role than his rank taken by itself supports this interpretation; after all a 
larger social distance demanded a higher degree of deference. German society as 
a whole was fundamentally unequal, with each person’s place in society defined 
by specific rights and privileges. Inequality permeated existence from essential 
issues down to everyday details such as the way people addressed each other. 
Thus, a sixteenth-century letter writing textbook listed 49 graded forms of address 
for spiritual personages, from cardinal to common priest, and 180 for temporal 
persons from emperor down to bailiff and cellarer (counting German recipients 
only). 142 of these forms of address applied to imperial estates.72 Moreover, any 
communication directed at someone higher up in the status order had to be 
peppered with ‘submissive’, ‘most submissive’ (if the social distance was more than 
one rank) and similar expressions of deference. No wonder Fynes Moryson from 
Cadeby in Lincolnshire, who travelled the Empire in the 1590s and was used to a 
less graded society, found the Germans ‘ever tedious in their stiles or titles’.73 
 
Evidently this inequality spilled over into the imperial diet where it distorted the 
decisions made by the princes’ college. There, members whose individual status 
was low allowed the duty to show deference to their betters to shape how they cast 





71 E.g. D.C. North, 'Institutions,' Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, 1 (1991), pp. 97-122; W. 
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1-17. 
72 J.P. Zwengel, New Groß Formular vnd vollkommlich Cantzlei Buch: von den besten vnd 
auszerlesenen Formularien aller deren Schrifften, so in ... Cantzleyen, auch sonst in den Ampten ... 
fürfallender geschäfft halben, bräuchlich seindt  (Frankfurt, 1568), fols. XIII-XXX. 
73 F. Moryson, An Itinerary Containing His Ten Yeeres Travell through the Twelve Dominions of 
Germany, Bohmer-land, Sweitzerland, Netherland, Denmarke, Poland, Italy, Turky, France, 




The open and sequential voting system practiced at the imperial diets and other 
assemblies allowed each estate or delegate to observe how higher-ranking 
members voted and to take this information into account when making his own 
decision. Despite institutional peculiarities – votes were not necessarily cast on 
clearly defined alternative options – imperial assemblies therefore offered the 
perfect environment for the bandwagon effect to play out. The above analysis of 
the polls conducted in the princes’ college of the diet of Augsburg of 1555 finds that 
among the most important determinants of the decision to imitate an earlier voter 
was the personal status of the member of the college as opposed to his rank in the 
Session order. What was relevant here was the fact that the estates represented 
at the diet were no more than the tip of an iceberg – the apex of a fundamentally 
unequal society where everyone, regardless which rung of the social ladder he had 
reached, owed deference to all those on the higher rungs. How popular (in the 
modern political sense of the word) earlier voters were is something the analysis 
cannot determine. However, functionally deference (and its flipside, the 
institutionalised respect high-status members of the college enjoyed) was the 
equivalent of popularity. It gave rise to the bandwagon effect in the same way as 
popularity does in modern elections. 
 
Such conditions had far-reaching implications not only for which decisions the 
members of the college made, but also for the chances that these decisions would 
be implemented. Estates who cast their votes under the influence of factors such 
as the deference owed to their superiors were likely to realise some time later (that 
is, once the influence exerted by high-status members of the college was gone) that 
they had helped making decisions which went against their own best interests. 
This, by turn, increased the chance that they would back out of their commitments 
and refuse to implement what the diet had decided. Such an outcome was all the 
more likely as members of the college whose personal status was low – for instance 
princes of the Church such as Bishop Melchior Zobel von Giebelstadt of Würzburg 
– were not necessarily less powerful than high-status members like e.g. the 
margraves of Baden.  
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In short, the analysis supports the hypothesis that the consensus reached with the 
help of the princes’ college’s sequential voting procedure was often superficial 
(influenced by the bandwagon effect) and transitory (likely to fall apart once the 
diet had dispersed). The fate of Charles V’s coinage ordinance of 1551 is a prime 
example of what could happen to a law based on such an agreement. After all, the 
imperial diet had asked the emperor to publish the ordinance, so a consensus had 
been reached. However, one of the core features of the bill was that it favoured 
some estates at the expense of others who found themselves in a minority 
position.74 The consensus of the diet was evidently not based on a compromise, it 
was clearly superficial, and it broke down within months of the publication of the 
ordinance. Note that the analysis above does not imply that the bandwagon effect 
was the only factor that might cause such a breakdown of consensus. In fact, many 
estates who failed to implement the coinage ordinance of 1551 had other good 
reasons, too (e.g. the political turmoil caused by the rebellion of the ‘war princes’).75 
However, the bandwagon effect demonstrably contributed to the ordinance’s lack 
of acceptance, and given the results of the above analysis it is likely that it 
contributed to similar problems on other occasions, also.  
 
Emperors who focused on compromise could mitigate but not solve the problem. 
Ferdinand I, for example, did agree a coinage ordinance in 1559 that was based on 
a genuine compromise and was widely and successfully implemented even in parts 
of the Empire that traditionally had formed its political periphery.76 However, 
addressing the tendency of the decisions of the diet to be distorted by the 
bandwagon effect would have required a fundamental reform of how the diet 
worked – a reform that would have had to replace the sequential polling system 
with a system of simultaneous voting. That, in turn, would have required 
accepting the idea that the estates represented in each of the diet’s three colleges 
were equal, and this is something no one was prepared to countenance. After all, 
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by extension it would have implied accepting that all members of German society 
were equal. In short, the system was impossible to reform. 
 
What light does this shed on the character of the Holy Roman Empire? It certainly 
was not nearly as dysfunctional as traditional Prussian-German historiography 
made it out to be. At one level, it might even be said that the diet’s sequential 
voting system helped political decision making by facilitating the formation of 
majorities. At another level, however, there is no denying that weaknesses existed 
– weaknesses analysed above, whose roots reached deep into the structure of 
German society. If historians draw a line from the consensual and participatory 
character of the Empire’s political culture to that of modern Germany, they can 
equally well point to a likely long-term consequence of the attention early modern 
political actors paid to titles and deference:77 Feudal ranks have disappeared, but 
the German respect for academic titles – a trait that has driven several modern 
politicians to committing acts of plagiarism – arguably reflects attitudes similar 
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The definition of the bandwagon-value: 
Formally, the share of earlier members of the princes’ college voting in the same 






with P being voter vi’s position in the ranking and A the answer with which the 
voter agrees. 
 
Table 4: Correlation of Session-ranking, Roman Month payments, Kammerzieler 
payments and revenues 
 










1.00    
Roman Month 1545 -0.53 1.00   
Kammerzieler 152 -0.48 0.91 1.00  
Revenues 1547-1548 -0.36 0.90 0.79 1.00 
 
 
